RTP ENC Aescm128IANA Registered

MIME: video/rtp-enc-aescm128
Extensions: —
{
  "full": "video/rtp-enc-aescm128",
  "type": "video",
  "subtype": "rtp-enc-aescm128",
  "extensions": [],
  "iana": {
    "template_url": "https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types/video/rtp-enc-aescm128",
    "type_name": "video",
    "subtype_name": "rtp-enc-aescm128",
    "encoding_considerations": "This type is framed and binary as defined in [96].",
    "security_considerations": "See considerations raised in RTP RFC 3550 [9] and any applicable profile like RFC 3551 [10] or RFC 3711 [72]. \nFurther see 3GPP TS 26.234, Release 6, Annex K for comments on security issues. The main issues that exist are:\n\n-  This RTP payload format only confidentiality protects the RTP payload, thus header information is leaked, \n   similarly to SRTP.\n\n-  The use of stream ciphers as AES CM and no integrity protection allows an attacker to purposefully attack the \n   content of the encrypted RTP payload by switching individual bits. \n\n-  The usage of selective encryption without integrity protection allows for an attacker to perform any replacements \n   of complete RTP payloads and packets it desires. \n   \n-  The payload format makes the receiver vulnerable to denial of service attacks that inserts RTP packets into the \n   stream, that the receiver then interprets as being encrypted thus wasting computational resources. To prevent this \n   attack, authentication needs to be used.",
    "additional_information": "Magic number(s): N/A\nFile extension(s): N/A\nMacintosh File Type Code(s): N/A",
    "template_text": "[omitted]"
  }
}